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A. Introduction 
1 A  “counter-claim”  is  “an  autonomous  legal  act”  by  the  Respondent  in a contentious case 
before  the  Court,  “the  object  of  which  is  to  submit  a  new  claim  to  the  Court,”  one  that  is  “linked  
to   the   principal   claim,   in   so   far   as,   formulated   as   a   ‘counter’   claim,   it   reacts   to”   the   principal  
claim.1 A counter-claim is not a defence on the merits to the principal claim;2 while it is a 
reaction to that claim, it is pursuing objectives other than simply dismissal of the principal 
claim.3 Hence, the reason for allowing a counter-claim to be included as part of an existing case 
is not because it assists in disposition of the principal claim but, rather, to assist in the disposition 
of two autonomous claims.4 The counter-claim is allowed to become a part of an existing case 
“in   order   to   ensure   better   administration   of   justice,   given   the specific nature of the claims in 
                                                          
1 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order on the Counter-
claims, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 256, para. 27. 
2 See Rosenne, S., ‘The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Revision  of  Articles  79  and  80  of  the  Rules  of  Court,’ Leiden 
J.  Int’l  L.  14 (2001), pp. 77-87, p. 85 
3 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), supra fn. 1, p. 256 para. 27; see Anzilotti, D., ‘La  
demande  reconventionnelle  en  procédure  internationale’,  p.  867  et seq.; Salerno,  F.,  ‘La  demande  reconventionnelle  
dans  la  procédure  de  la  Cour  Internationale  de  Justice’,  RGDIP  103  (1999),  pp.  329-78 pp. 333 et seq. 
4 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), supra fn. 1,, p. 874 et seq. 
  
question”  and  “to  achieve  a  procedural  economy  whilst  enabling  the  Court  to  have  an  overview  
of  the  respective  claims  of  the  parties  and  to  decide  them  more  consistently.”5 
2 The I.C.J. Statute does not directly address the issue of the Respondent filing a counter-
claim against the Applicant. Art. 80 of the Rules, however, provides that the Court may entertain 
such a counter-claim in certain circumstances, as a part of the incidental proceedings of an 
existing case. The Court’s  establishment of this rule is generally predicated on its authority under 
Article  48  of  the  Statute  to  “make  orders  for  the  conduct  of  the  case”. 
3 Counter-claims featured somewhat in the early life of the Court (in 1950-52), but then 
disappeared for several decades, only reemerging in several cases after 1997. Renewed interest 
in the use of counter-claims may be due to a desire by Respondents to present to the Court a 
more balanced perspective of the conduct of the two States before it, since inclusion of the 
counter-claim may force both the Court and the other party to confront certain facts and legal 
arguments  that  otherwise  would  not  feature  in  the  case.  From  the  Court’s  perspective,  allowing  a  
counter-claim in the proper circumstances promotes the value of judicial economy,6 since 
addressing the claim and counter-claim in a single proceeding may be more efficient than doing 
so in separate cases. At the same time, there are requirements that must be met before a counter-
claim may be entertained, requirements designed to prevent a Respondent from using an 
unrelated counter-claim simply as a tactic for slowing down the disposition of principal claim 
and for detracting from a central focus on that claim. 
4 In the normal course of any Respondent defending against a claim, the Respondent will 
assert  a  factual  and  legal  position  that  ‘counters’  the  position  of  the  Applicant.  Advancement  of  
that  position,  however,   is  not  regarded  as  a  ‘counter-claim’  with  the  meaning  of  Art. 80 of the 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p.257, para. 30; see Genet, R., ‘Les demandes reconventionnelles’, p. 145 et seq., 148; Antonopoulos, 
C., Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice (2011), pp. 57 et seq. 
6 See Rosenne, S., ‘The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Revision  of  Articles  79  and  80  of  the  Rules  of  Court,’Leiden 
J.  Int’l  L.  14 (2001), pp. 77-87, p. 87 
  
Rules, and does not implicate the requirements and procedures discussed below.7 Indeed, the 
relatively limited practice of counter-claims may be because the Court, when rejecting any claim 
on the merits, concomitantly accepts the position of the Respondent in much the same way as it 
would if a closely-related counter-claim had been filed.8 A counter-claim only arises before the 
Court as part of a formal step taken by the Respondent. That step changes the possibilities of the 
case, for it invites the Court to issue a judgment directed against the Applicant, opening the door 
to a remedy against the very State that initiated the case.9 
B. Historical Development of the Rule Dealing with Counter-Claims 
I. P.C.I.J. 
5 Like the I.C.J. Statute, the Statute of the P.C.I.J. did not address the issue of counter-
claims. Art. 40 of the 1922 Rules of Court of the P.C.I.J., however, envisaged the possibility of 
“counter-claims”   being   filed   as   a   part   of   a   Respondent’s   responsive   pleading,   insofar   as   they  
“come  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,”10 but provided no particular guidance on how such 
counter-claims should proceed. This initial and very cursory reference to counter-claims was not 
changed in the Rules of Court adopted in 1926 and 1931.11 The issue was much further 
developed in Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules of the Court, which provided that counter-claims were 
limited to cases initiated by a unilateral application, must be filed with the Counter-Memorial, 
and  must  be  “directly  connected”  to  the  subject-matter of the application.12 
                                                          
7 Genet, R., ‘Les demandes reconventionnelles’, p. 145 et seq. 
8 See, e.g., Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Judgment,ICJ Reports (1991), pp. 53, 
75-76,  para.  69(3)  (rejecting  the  applicant’s  position  that  the  award  was  not  binding  and  instead  finding  that  the  
award was binding and must be applied by, inter alia, the Applicant). 
9 Anzilotti, D., ‘La  demande  reconventionnelle  en  procédure  internationale’,  p.  874  et seq 
10 Rules of Court, adopted on 24 March 1922, PCIJ, Series D, No. 2, Art. 40. 
11  Guyomar, G., Règlement, p. 519. 
12  Rules of Court, adopted on 11 March 1936, PCIJ, Series D, No. 1, 3rd edn.,Art. 63; Guyomar, G., 
Règlement, p. 522. 
  
6 Counter-claims arose before the P.C.I.J. in three cases.13 In Factory at Chorzów, Poland 
filed   a   document   that   it   titled   a   “counter-claim.”   The   Court   regarded   Poland’s   submission   as  
juridically  connected  to  Germany’s  claim  (indeed,  the  concept  of  “direct  connection”  identified 
here influenced the later crafting of Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules), but the  Court  viewed  Poland’s  
submission as simply an effort to offset the amount of compensation that might be paid to 
Germany.  The  Court  assumed  jurisdiction  over  Poland’s  submission  by  virtue of its jurisdiction 
over   Germany’s   claim,   but   rejected   the   submission   in   the   course   of   deciding   in   favor   of  
Germany.14 It should be noted that, since the Rules of Court rather confusingly contemplated a 
Respondent  filing  a  “counter-case,”  which  might include  “counter-claims,”  it  may  not  have  been  
clear to Poland what was meant by a true counter-claim. 
7 In Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Belgium filed a counter-claim, over which the 
Court found (without objection from the Netherlands) that it had jurisdiction and further found 
that  it  was  directly  connected  to  the  Netherlands’  claim.15 Nevertheless, on the merits, the Court 
rejected both the claim and counter-claim as unfounded.16 In Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, 
Lithuania advanced a counter-claim contingent  on  the  Court  finding  Estonia’s  claim  admissible,  
which the Court did not. As such, the Court did not pass upon the counter-claim.17 
II. I.C.J. 
8 The 1946 Rules of Court addressed counter-claims in Art. 63, which generally (but not 
exactly) followed Art. 63 of the P.C.I.J. Rules of Court. Three counter-claims were filed under 
the 1946 formulation of the rule, all in the period of 1950-52. Norway filed a counter-claim in 
                                                          
13 For an analysis of the practice of the PCIJ, see Antonopoulos, C., Counterclaims before the International Court of 
Justice (2011), pp. 37-47. 
14 Factory at Chorzów (Germany/Poland), Judgment, PCIJ Reports (1928), Series A, No. 17, pp 34-39, 63-
64; see Genet, R., ‘Les demandes reconventionnelles’, p. 161 et seq.; Anzilotti, D., ‘La  demande  reconventionnelle  
en  procédure  internationale’,  p.  857  et seq 
15  Guyomar, G., Règlement, p. 522; Genet, R., ‘Les demandes reconventionnelles’, p. 168 et seq. 
16 Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium), Judgment, PCIJ Reports (1937), Ser. A/B, 
No. 70, pp. 28-32. 
17 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Estonia v. Lithuania), Judgment, PCIJ Reports (1939), Series A/B, No. 76, 
pp. 7-9, 22; see Guyomar, G., Règlement, p. 522. 
  
1950 against the United Kingdom in Fisheries Jurisdiction; Peru filed a counter-claim in 1950 
against Colombia in Asylum; and the United States filed a counter-claim in 1951 against Spain in 
Rights of Nationals.18 
9 The 1972 Rules of Court renumbered the rule on counter-claims as Article 68, but no 
counter-claims were filed during the period that those rules were in force. The 1978 Rules of 
Court revised the text of the article on counter-claims and renumbered it as Art. 80. Four cases 
filed during the time that the 1978 Rules of Court were in force resulted in the filing of a 
counter-claim: Yugoslavia filed counter-claims in 1997 against Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia); the United States filed a counter-claim in 
1997 against Iran in Oil Platforms; Nigeria filed counter-claims in 1999 against Cameroon in 
Land and Maritime Boundary; and Uganda filed counter-claims in 2001 against the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.  
10 In 2000, the Court amended Art. 80 of the Rules to its present formulation,19 which 
applies to all cases submitted to the Court on or after 1 February 2001. As of 2011,  two cases 
have included the filing of a counter-claim under the 2000 amendment: Italy filed a counter-
claim in 2009 against Germany in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State; and Serbia filed a 
counter-claim in 2010 against Croatia in Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia). 
11 The different versions of the rule address similar issues, but variations in the text mean 
that decisions reached by the Court in prior cases should be considered in light of the formulation 
of the rule on counter-claims in existence at that time. Further, some changes in the text provide 
a basis for how best to interpret the rule that is currently in force. For example, in the 
formulations of the rule prior to 1978, the text indicated that a counter-claim could only be made 
in cases that began by the filing of an application, which made clear that a counter-claim was not 
                                                          
18  Guyomar, G., Règlement, p. 522 et seq. 
19 See Rosenne, S., ‘The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Revision  of  Articles  79  and  80  of  the  Rules  of  Court,’Leiden 
J.  Int’l  L.  14 (2001), pp. 77-87, pp. 83 et seq. 
  
envisaged for a case initiated by a joint application of two States. The more recent formulations 
of the rule contain no such requirement. Though it is likely that the filing of a joint application 
by two States would already encompass whatever claims the two States wish to bring against 
each other, it is possible that developments in the case subsequent to the filing of the joint 
application   might   result   in   one   of   the   States   wishing   to   introduce   a   new   “counter-claim”   in  
response   to   the   other   State’s   presentation   of   its   claim.   The   change   in   formulation   of   the   rule  
would appear to allow such a counter-claim, so long as the other requirements of Art. 80 of the 
Rules are met. 
C. Issues of Interpretation 
12 As  indicated  above,  the  Court’s  rule  on  counter-claims has changed somewhat over time.  
Likewise, the application and interpretation of the rule by the Court in several cases has helped 
clarify and develop the meaning of the rule. This section addresses the key areas where the 
Court’s  jurisprudence  has  shaped  the  regime  on  counter-claims. 
 
I. Two Requirements in Order to Entertain the Counter-Claim 
13 Art. 80, para.1 of the Rules allows   the  Court   to   entertain   a   “counter-claim.”  The  Rule  
does   not   define   what   is   meant   by   “counter-claim”   and   whether   that   term,   by   itself,   imposes  
certain limitations upon what may be filed.  In  his  dissenting  opinion  with  respect  to  Yugoslavia’s  
counter-claim in Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), Judge Weeramantry insisted 
that the term required that the counter-claim  “counter”  the  principal  claim,  rather  than  simply  be  
a parallel claim arising from circumstances linked in space and time to the principal claim. For 
Judge  Weeramantry,   there  “must  be   some  point  of   intersection  between   the   two  claims,  which  
makes one exert an influence upon the judicial consequence of the other.”20 The counter-claim 
                                                          
20 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), supra fn. 1, Diss. Op. Weeramantry, pp. 287, 289. 
  
might go further than just impinging upon or weakening the principal claim by seeking 
reparation   from   the  Applicant,   but   it   still  must   “counter”   the   principal   claim;;   a   “claim   that   is  
autonomous and has no bearing on the determination of the initial claim does not thus qualify as 
a counter-claim.”21 In   the   context   of   that   case,   Yugoslavia’s   counter-claim that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina committed acts of genocide could not possibly diminish, off-set or weaken any acts 
of genocide committed by  Yugoslavia  and  thus,  for  Judge  Weeramantry,  Yugoslavia’s  counter-
claim  was  incapable  of  “countering”  the  principal  claim.22 
14 Judge   Weeramantry’s   view,   however,   was   not   adopted   by   the   Court.   In   that   and  
subsequent cases, the Court has not viewed the term “counter-claim”   as   itself   embodying  
particular constraints on the type of claim that may be filed with the Court. Instead, the Court has 
focused on the other language of Art. 80, para. 1 of the Rules, which provides that the Court may 
entertain a counter-claim   “only   if”   two   requirements   are  met:  when   the   counter-claim   “comes  
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court”  and  when  the  counter-claim  is  “directly  connected  with  the  
subject   matter   of   the   claim   of   the   other   party.”   The   Court   has   characterized   these   two  
requirements  both  as  requirements  on  the  “admissibility  of  a  counter-claim  as  such,”  explaining  
that   admissibility   “in   this   context   must   be   understood   broadly   to   encompass   both   the  
jurisdictional requirement and the direct-connection  requirement.”23 
15 The reason for the first requirement, relating to jurisdiction, is to preclude the Respondent 
from using the counter-claim   “as   a  means   of   referring   to   an   international   court   claims  which  
exceed   the   limits   of   its   jurisdiction  as   recognized  by   the  parties.”24 The reason for the second 
requirement,   relating   to   “direct   connection,”   is   to   preclude   the   Respondent   from   using   the  
                                                          
21 Ibid., p. 291. 
22 Ibid., pp. 292-94. 
23 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State(Germany v. Italy), Order on the Counter-Claim, ICJ Reports (2010), 
para. 14; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Order on the Counter-Claim, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 
190,203, para. 33; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Orderon the Counter-claims, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 678, para. 35. 
24 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), supra fn. 1, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 257-58, para. 31. 
  
counter-claim  as  a  “means  either  to  impose  on  the  Applicant  any  claim  it  chooses,  at  the  risk  of  
infringing  the  Applicant’s  rights  and  of  compromising  the  proper  administration  of  justice.”25 
16 The  use  of  “may  entertain”   rather   than  “shall   entertain”  makes clear that acceptance of 
the counter-claim as a part of the case, even if the counter-claim meets these two requirements, is 
wholly within the discretion of the Court; it still remains open for the Court to decline to address 
the counter-claim within the proceedings.26 To date, the Court has not exercised such discretion; 
in each instance where it has found both requirements to have been met, the Court has allowed 
the counter-claim to proceed as part of the case. 
17 The   use   of   the  word   “only”  makes   clear   that,   if   either   of   the   two   requirements   is   not  
satisfied, the Court should not entertain the counter-claim. Even if the Applicant does not object 
to the counter-claim, it appears that the Court must still consider whether the counter-clam meets 
these two requirements. Thus, in Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia), although 
Croatia indicated that it did not intend to raise objections to the  admissibility  of  Serbia’s  counter-
claims,  that  alone  did  not  dispose  of  the  matter.  Rather,  the  Court  simply  stated  that  it  “does  not  
consider that it is required to rule definitively at this stage on the question of whether the said 
claims fulfill the  conditions  set  forth  in  Article  80,  paragraph  1,  of  the  Rules  of  Court.”27 In its 
practice to date, whenever the Court has found one or the other requirement as not having been 
met, it has declined to allow the counter-claim to become a part of the case before it. 
18 In the formulations of the rule prior to 2000, the two key requirements for the filing of a 
counter-claim – that it falls within the jurisdiction of the Court and that it be directly connected 
with the subject matter of the principal claim – were reversed. The current formulation, 
therefore, places somewhat greater emphasis on need for the counter-claim to fall within the 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 See Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005 (2006), Vol. III, p. 1234;.but see 
Antonopoulos, C., Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice (2011), p. 74 . 
27 Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia v. Serbia), ICJ Reports (2010), Order of 4 February 
(emphasis added). 
  
jurisdiction of the Court; in the event that it does not, the question of whether it is directly 
connected to the principal claim becomes irrelevant. As it happens, even in the cases before the 
Court that arose under the prior formulation of the rule, the Court first determined whether it had 
jurisdiction over the counter-claim before proceeding to the issue of the connection with the 
principal claim. 
II. Jurisdiction Over the Counter-Claim  “As  Such” 
19 As indicated above, paragraph 1 of Art. 80 of the Rules provides that the counter-claim 
may  be  entertained  only  if  it  “comes  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.” 
20 To the extent   that   the   Applicant   fails   to   object   to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction   over   the  
counter-claim at any point in the proceeding, the Court typically finds that jurisdiction exists 
with little if any discussion28. Thus, in U.S. Nationals in Morocco, France invoked the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to obtain a finding that a Treaty concluded between the 
United States and the Emperor of Morocco in September 1936 provided only for exemptions 
from local jurisdiction for U.S. nationals in Morocco in certain limited, specified cases. In its 
Counter-Memorial, the United States maintained by means of a counter-claim that it was entitled 
to more extensive benefits. In its Reply, France contested the merits of the U.S. position, but did 
not object to the jurisdiction of the Court over the U.S. counter-claim. The Court proceeded to 
deal with the counter-claim without any discussion of jurisdiction (or, for that matter, the 
connectivity of the counter-claim to the claim).29 Similarly, when Nigeria filed its counter-claim 
against Cameroon, the latter indicated no objection of any kind, and the Court found without 
discussion that jurisdiction existed.30 
                                                          
28 Murphy,  S.,  ‘Amplifying  the  World  Court’s  Jurisdiction  through  Counter-claims and Third  Party  Intervention’,  
Geo.  Wash.  Univ.  Int’l  L.  Rev. 33 (2000-2001), pp. 5-30, p. 17. 
29 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of America), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports (1952), pp. 176, 203-12; see Guyomar, Règlement, p. 524. 
30 Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order on the Counter-claims, ICJ Reports (1999), 
pp. 983, 985. 
  
21 The Applicant might object to the admissibility of the counter-claim, but not with respect 
to the jurisdictional requirement. Thus, in Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina invoked the compromissory clause of the Genocide Convention against 
Yugoslavia to advance its claim that Yugoslavia had committed acts of genocide in violation of 
the Convention. Yugoslavia invoked the same basis of jurisdiction to advance its counter-claim 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina had committed acts of genocide. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina 
objected to the connection of the counter-claim to the principal claim, it did not object to the 
Court’s   jurisdiction   over   the   counter-claim. In the course of finding the counter-claim 
admissible, the Court simply noted the lack of any jurisdictional objection.31 Likewise, in the 
context of a claim by the Democratic Republic of the Congo   (D.R.C.)  based  upon   the  Court’s  
compulsory  jurisdiction,   the  D.R.C.  objected  to  the  admissibility  of  Uganda’s  counter-claim on 
the issue of connectivity, but not with respect to jurisdiction.32 The Court noted that the D.R.C. 
“does   not   deny   that   Uganda’s claims fulfill the   ‘jurisdictional’   condition”33 and proceeded to 
address  solely  the  issue  of  connectivity  in  disposing  of  the  D.R.C.’s  objection. 
22 The  Applicant  might   object   to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction,   but   only  with   respect   to   some  
aspects of the counter-claim. In Asylum, Peru advanced a counter-claim to the effect that 
Colombia acted unlawfully under the 1928 Convention on Asylum by granting asylum to Víctor 
Raúl  Haya  de  la  Torre.  The  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  the  counter-claim as originally formulated 
was not challenged by Colombia and the Court proceeded based on an assumption that 
jurisdiction existed.34 At the oral hearing in October 1950, however, Peru amended the counter-
claim  to  include  that  “the  maintenance  of  the  asylum  constitutes  at  the  present time a violation 
of”  the  1928  Convention.  Colombia  did  object  to  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  this  addition,  but  
                                                          
31 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), supra fn. 1, ICJ Reports (1997), p.258, para. 32. 
32 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), p. 666, para.8. 
33 Ibid., p. 677, para. 30. 
34 Asylum (Colombia/Peru), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1950), pp. 266, 280. 
  
given   the  Court’s   ultimate   disposition   of   the   principal   claim   in   favor   of   Colombia,   the  Court  
found it superfluous to address the jurisdictional objection.35 
23 The Applicant might also object to  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  the  entire  counter-claim. 
In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State,   Italy  sought  to  found  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  the  
counter-claim upon the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Art. 
27(a) of the Convention stated that its provisions did not apply to facts or situations arising prior 
to  the  Convention’s  entry  into  force.  Because  Italy’s  counter-claim appeared to concern facts and 
situations that predated the Convention (harm to Italians committed by Nazi Germany between 
1943 and 1945, and the waiver of claims contained in the 1947 Peace Treaty), Germany 
maintained   that   Italy’s   counter-claim   fell   outside   the   scope   of   the   Court’s   jurisdiction. Italy 
sought to argue that its counter-claim actually concerned inadequate and incomplete efforts at 
reparation beginning with two 1961 Settlement Agreements and continuing to recent years. The 
Court, however, agreed with Germany that such later developments  were  not  “new”  situations  
post-dating the entry into force of the Convention; rather, they simply concerned the existence 
and scope of a German obligation to make reparation for violations that had occurred at a much 
earlier time.36 Therefore the Court had no jurisdiction over the counter-claim and it was 
inadmissible. 
24 Art. 80, para. 1 of the Rules does not require, by its terms, that the counter-claim be based 
upon the exact same jurisdictional basis upon which the principal claim arises.37 As such, the text 
arguably   leaves  open   the  possibility   that,   for   example,   in   a   case  brought  based  on   the  Court’s  
jurisdiction under the compromissory clause of a treaty to interpret one provision of that treaty, 
the counter-claim  might  be  based  upon  the  Court’s  jurisdiction to interpret a different provision 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p. 288; see Guyomar, Règlement, p. 521 et seq. 
36 Jurisdictional Immunities, supra fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2010), paras. 26-31. 
37 See Thirlway,  H.,  ‘Counterclaims  before  the  International Court of Justice: The Genocide Convention and Oil 
Platforms Decisions’,  Leiden J.  Int’l  L. 12 (1999), pp. 197-229, pp. 203 et seq; Antonopoulos, C., Counterclaims 
before the International Court of Justice (2011), pp. 74-80. 
  
of the same treaty. Further, in theory, the counter-claim   might   be   based   upon   the   Court’s  
jurisdiction under a compromissory clause of an entirely different treaty, or upon an entirely 
different type of jurisdiction,  such  as  invocation  of  the  Court’s  compulsory  jurisdiction.38 
25 In the Oil Platforms case, however, there is some suggestion that the jurisdictional basis 
available for a counter-claim might be limited to the existing jurisdiction over the principal 
claim.  In  that  case,  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  Iran’s  claim  was  restricted  by  the  Court,  at  the  
jurisdiction phase of the case, solely to the interpretation of Art. X, para. 1, of the 1955 U.S.-Iran 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights.39 That paragraph provides that 
“[b]etween   the   territories   of   the   two   High   Contracting   Parties   there   shall   be   freedom   of  
commerce  and  navigation,”  whereas  the  other  paragraphs  of  Art.  X  deal  with  various  rights  and  
privileges of vessels of the two parties. When the United States then filed its Counter-Memorial, 
it included a counter-claim concerning alleged Iranian attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf, as 
well as the laying of mines and other military actions, in violation of Art. X as a whole, not just 
paragraph   1   of   that   article.   Iran   objected   to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction   over   the   counter-claim, 
asserting  in  part  that  the  United  States  “seeks  to  widen  the  dispute  to  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  
Amity  …  which  were   never   in   question   in   the   proceedings.”40 In response, the United States 
argued that the Court, under the 1978 formulation of the rule, should not reach the issue of 
jurisdiction at the preliminary stage; instead the only matter properly at issue under Art. 80 of the 
Rules was whether there was doubt that the counter-claim was directly connected to the principal 
claim. 
26 In its Order on the counter-claim, the Court did not limit itself to the issue of 
connectivity;;  it  squarely  addressed  the  issue  of  jurisdiction  “as  such”  over  the  counter-claim. The 
                                                          
38 Genet, R., ‘Les demandes reconventionnelles’, p. 161 et seq.; Anzilotti, D., ‘La  demande  reconventionnelle  
en procédure  internationale’,  p.  868  et seq 
39 Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports (1996), pp. 803, 821, para. 55. 
40 Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), supra fn. 23, ICJ Reports (1998), p. 196, para.12. 
  
Court  first  noted  that,   in   its  prior  judgment  on  jurisdiction  over  Iran’s  principal  claim,   it  found  
that Art. X, para. 1, protected not just the immediate sale of goods, but also ancillary activities 
integrally related to such commerce.41 Then, the Court found that the activities at issue in the 
counter-claim   “are   capable   of   falling   within   the   scope   of   Art.   X,   para.   1”   and   therefore   “the  
Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged 
may have prejudiced the  freedoms  guaranteed  by  Art.  X,  para.  1.”42 In the dispositif, the Court 
then   found   that   the   counterclaim   was   “admissible   as   such   and   forms   part   of   the   current  
proceedings.”43 
27 In so doing, the Court may have limited the counter-claim to alleged violations arising 
under only Art. X, para. 1, not Art. X as a whole. If so, however, the Court did not explain 
exactly why the counter-claim was to be so limited, a step criticized by Judge Higgins in her 
separate opinion. According to Higgins: 
In the first place, findings that reject the contentions of a party should be based on reasons. 
The disturbing tendency to offer conclusions but not reasons is not to be welcomed. In the 
second place, the inarticulate assumption that the jurisdictional basis established for a 
claim necessarily is the only jurisdictional basis for, and sets the limits to, a counter-claim, 
is open to challenge. 
… 
There is nothing in the Rules or practice of the Court to suggest that the very identical 
jurisdictional nexus must be established by a counter-claimant. The travaux préparatoires to 
the various formulations of what is now Article 80 of the Rules contain no suggestion 
whatever that this was thought of as a requirement. The rule on counter-claims has gone 
through successive changes. But neither in the discussions of 1922, nor of 1934, 1935, 1936, 
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nor again of 1946, 1968, 1970, 1972, does this thought anywhere appear.44 Nor does the 
wording of Article 80, paragraph 1 of the Rules suggest this. It requires that a counter-claim 
“comes   within   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Court”,   not   that   it   “was   within   the   jurisdiction  
established  by  the  Court  in  respect  of  the  claims  of  the  applicant”.45 
29 If  Judge  Higgins’  interpretation  of  what  the  Court  did  is  correct,  then  a  counter-claim that 
is based upon a legal provision different from that upon which the principal claim is based may 
encounter difficulty, at least in circumstances where the Court has already passed upon and 
limited the scope of the principal claim. Such an approach would no doubt be influenced by the 
second admissibility requirement (discussed in Section C(III)), which is that the counter-claim 
must be directly connected with the subject matter of the principal claim. In many instances, the 
“connectivity”   issue   may   also   require   a   close   relationship between the jurisdiction of the 
principal claim and the jurisdiction of the counter-claim. 
30 However, it is not actually clear that the Court limited the U.S. counter-claim to Art. X, 
para. 1 of the 1955 Treaty. In the course of the subsequent merits phase, Iran remained 
concerned that portions of Art. X other than paragraph one were still part of the counter-claim, 
and hence objected that any portion of the counter-claim based upon those paragraphs should be 
regarded as inadmissible.46 In addressing  Iran’s  objection  the  Court,  in  its  2003  judgment  on  the  
merits, did not assert that it had decided that the U.S. counter-claim was limited to 
Art. X, para. 1. Instead, the Court noted that the United States itself, in the submissions filed with 
its Rejoinder,   “substantially   narrowed   the   basis   of   its   counter-claim”   by   only   referring   to  
Art. X, para. 1  thereby  depriving  Iran’s  objection  “of  any  object.”47 In  other  words,  the  Court’s  
ultimate judgment strongly suggests that the 1998 Order of the Court did not restrict the counter-
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46 See ibid., p. 209, para. 103. 
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claim to Art. X, para. 1;;   that  “narrowing”  only  happened   in  March  2001  by   the  conduct  of   the  
United States itself when filing its Rejoinder. 
31 In any event, in situations where the Court finds that the jurisdictional requirement has 
not been made, it refrains from moving on to the next requirement concerning direct connection 
of the counter-claim with the subject matter of the claim.48 If the Court finds that the 
jurisdictional requirement has been met, it proceeds to the next requirement. 
32 Importantly, a finding in favor of jurisdiction for purposes of Art. 80 of the Rules does 
not  definitively  resolve  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  the  counter-claim. The Court uses language 
in its Order to the effect that it has found admissibility under Art. 80 of the Rules “as  such,”49 by 
which it appears to mean that, on the facts as pled by the Respondent, the counter-claim appears 
to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. Further,  the  Court  includes  language  that  the  Order  “in  
no way prejudges any question with which the Court would have to deal during the remainder of 
the  proceedings.”50Although the Court has not characterized this approach to jurisdiction under 
Art. 80 of the Rules as a form of prima facie jurisdiction, akin to that used in the context of 
proceedings on interim measures of protection, it would appear to operate in much the same way. 
As discussed below in Section C(IX),  the  Applicant  remains  able,  in  the  course  of  the  “merits”  
phase of the case, to revisit the issue of jurisdiction in the context of all the facts and law 
developed during that phase, and to demonstrate to the Court that jurisdiction does not actually 
exist over the counter-claim. 
III. Direct Connection with the Subject Matter of the Claim 
33 Paragraph 1 of Art. 80 of the Rules also provides that the counter-claim may be 
entertained   only   if   it   “is   directly   connected   with   the   subject-matter of the claim of the other 
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party.”51 Art. 80 of the Rules provides no guidance as to how such a connection is to be assessed 
and application of this requirement appears to be more of an art than a rigid science. Indeed, 
signaling  its  considerable  latitude  when  applying  the  requirement,  the  Court  has  stressed  that  “it  
is for the Court, in its sole discretion, to assess whether the counter-claim is sufficiently 
connected  to  the  principal  claim,  taking  into  account  the  particular  aspects  of  each  case.”52 
34 In the event that no objection is made to the connection of the counter-claim to the claim, 
the Court nevertheless examines on its own such connectivity. Thus, in the Land and Maritime 
Boundary case,  Cameroon  did  not  object  to  Nigeria’s  counter-claim, but the Court nevertheless 
discussed and determined that a connection existed.53 In that instance, the Court was confronted 
with Cameroon’s   claim   that   Nigeria   had   unlawfully   occupied   Cameroon’s   territory   in   the  
Bakassi   Peninsula   and  with  Nigeria’s   counter-claims that Cameroon had engaged in unlawful 
incursions into Nigerian territory along the same land border. The Court determined that 
Nigeria’s  counter-claims  were  “directly  connected”  since  they 
rest  on   facts  of   the   same  nature  as   the  corresponding  claims  of  Cameroon,  and  …  all  of  
those  facts  are  alleged  to  have  occurred  along  the  frontier  between  the  two  States;;  …  the  
claims of in question of each of the Parties pursue the same legal aim, namely the 
establishment of legal responsibility and the determination of the reparation due on this 
account…54 
35 If   the   Respondent   does   object   due   to   the   lack   of   a   “direct   connection”   between   the  
principal claim and the counter-claim, the Court may readily dismiss that objection, as occurred 
in the Asylum case.55 In   that   case,   Colombia’s   principal   claim   concerned   Peru’s   alleged  
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obligation   to   allow   for   safe   conduct   of   Víctor   Raúl   Haya   de   la   Torre.   Peru’s   counter-claim 
alleged that the asylum was not lawful under the Convention. Colombia challenged the 
admissibility of the counter-claim, arguing that it was not directly connected with the subject-
matter of the Application. The Court rejected the objection, stating: 
It emerges clearly from the arguments of the Parties that the second submission of the 
Government of Colombia, which concerns the demand for a safe conduct, rests largely on 
the alleged regularity of the asylum, which is precisely what is disputed by the counter-
claim. The connexion is so direct that certain conditions which are required to exist before 
a safe-conduct can be demanded depend precisely on facts which are raised by the counter-
claim. The direct connexion being thus clearly established, the sole objection to the 
admissibility of the counter-claim in its original form is therefore removed.56 
 
36 Yet in other instances, the counter-claim may not be essentially an inescapable 
component   or   “flip   side”   of   the   principal   claim,   in  which   case   the Court must weigh the two 
Parties’   differing   views   as   to   what   it   is   about   the   two   claims   that   must   “connect”   and   how  
“direct”   the   connection   must   be.   The   rule   does   not   indicate   whether   the   assessment   of   the  
“connection”  concerns  facts,  concerns  law,  or  concerns some combination of the two. Issues of 
admissibility before the Court typically depend on facts57 not law, but in its jurisprudence on 
counter-claims,   the   Court   has   said   that   the   existence   of   the   “direct   connection”   must   be  
considered   “both   in   fact   and   in   law,”   and  with   regard   to  whether   the   parties   are   pursuing   the  
same  “legal  aims.”58 
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37 As  is  the  case  for  understanding  the  meaning  of  “counter-claim”  (as  discussed  above  in  
Section C(I),   the  Court   does   not   approach   the   “connection”   requirement   as   requiring that the 
counter-claim necessarily seek to diminish, off-set, or neutralize the principal claim. Some 
counter-claims may have that effect, but the lack of that element does not defeat the requisite 
connection to the principal claim. For example, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo,  the  Court  rejected  the  D.R.C.’s  position  that  the  arguments  supporting  the  counter-claim 
“must  both  support  the  counter-claim and be pertinent for the purposes of rebutting the principal 
claim.”59 
38 Further, the  factual  “connection”  or  “complex”  for  comparing  the  principal  claim  and  the  
counter-claim, as seen in the decisions of the Court, does not require that the underlying facts of 
the two claims be identical.60 Indeed, in most situations, the facts supporting the claim and the 
counter-claim are not the same, but they are related. For the Court, that relationship appears to 
turn up on two key factors: the period of time during which the conduct at issue occurred and its 
geographic location. The period of time of the conduct at issue in the two claims need not be 
exactly the same; conduct relating to one claim might span a longer time period than the other. 
The geographic location also need not be exactly the same; the conduct at issue in the counter-
claim might occur in a place not at issue in the principal claim. Nevertheless, a relationship in 
time  and  space  does  need  to  exist.  The  “legal  connection”  seems  to  turn  on  two  further  factors:  
the legal and non-legal instruments at issue, and the overall objective of addressing a particular 
legal relationship between the parties. In most instances, it seems important whether the 
conventional or customary law at issue with respect to both claims is largely or exclusively the 
same; invocation of an entirely new instrument in the counter-claim as having been violated may 
be a basis for denying a sufficient connection of that part of the counter-claim. 
                                                          
59 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), p. 679, para. 38. 
60 See Thirlway,  H.,  ‘Counterclaims  before  the  International Court of Justice: The Genocide Convention and Oil 
Platforms Decisions’,  Leiden  J.  Int’l  L. 12 (1999), pp. 197-229, p. 218. 
  
39 The standard is best understood as applied by the Court in specific cases. In Application 
of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a claim that concerned 
allegations of wide-ranging   conduct   in   the   early   1990’s   in   Bosnia   and   Herzegovina   by  
Yugoslavia,   including   “ethnic   cleansing,”   summary   execution,   bombardment   of   the   civilian  
population, destruction of property, and other acts that constituted or related to genocide, all 
directed  at  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina’s  non-Serb population. In its Counter-Memorial, Yugoslavia 
advanced a counter-claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible in the same time period 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina of comparable acts of genocide, this time directed at Bosnian Serbs. 
Both the claim and counter-claim, therefore, involved conduct in the same place (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina)   and   in   the   same   time   frame   (the   early   1990’s)   that allegedly violated the same 
treaty (the Genocide Convention). 
40 Bosnia   and   Herzegovina   nevertheless   objected   to   the   admissibility   of   Yugoslavia’s  
counter-claim   as   not   “directly   connected”   to   the   principal   claim,  maintaining   that   the   facts   at  
issue in the counter-claim  were  “totally  different”  from  those  of  the  principal  claim,  and  that  the  
examination  of  one  set  of  facts  “would  be  of  no  help  in  the  judicial  analysis  of  the  other  set  and  
could  not  affect  its  outcome  in  any  way  whatsoever.”61 Moreover, as a legal matter, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina argued that erga omnes rights at issue in the Genocide Convention are inherently 
non-reciprocal in nature; there is nothing about the adherence or lack of adherence by one Party 
to the Convention that has any bearing on the obligations of a different Party.62 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  insisted  that  connectivity  required  some  element  of  “countering”  the  principal  claim  
by reducing or neutralizing its effects.63 
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41 For its part, Yugoslavia maintained that there was no requirement that the exact same 
facts be at issue.64 Further, Yugoslavia noted that both claims were based upon the same treaty 
and  the  same  general  rules  of  state  responsibility,  and  that  the  facts  of  both  concerned  “the  same  
tragic conflict, i.e., civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which happened in a single territorial 
and temporal setting, based on the same historical background and within the framework of the 
same  political  development.”65 Moreover, Yugoslavia maintained that analyzing the facts of the 
counter-claim was “of   crucial   importance   to   answer   the   question   of   attribution   to   the  
Respondents  of  acts  alleged  by  the  Applicant”,  since  in  some  instances  the  identical  facts  were  at  
issue with respect to allegations arising under both claims.66 Finally, since a violation of the 
Convention involved assessing the intent of the underlying conduct, Yugoslavia argued that 
understanding the facts associated with the counter-claim was essential for understanding 
Yugoslavia’s  intent  in  taking  certain  actions  at  certain  times.67 
42 The  Court  rejected  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina’s  position  and  found  the  “direct  connection”  
requirement to have been met. With respect to the facts, the Court stated: 
[I]n  the  present  case,  it  emerges  from  the  Parties’  submissions  that  their  respective claims 
rest  on  facts  of   the  same  nature;;  …  they  form  part  of   the  same  factual  complex  since  all  
those facts are alleged to have occurred on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
during  the  same  time  period;;  and  …  Yugoslavia  states,  moreover,  that  it intends to rely on 
certain identical facts in order to refute the allegations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to 
obtain judgment against that State.68 
43 Hence,   the   concept   of   a   “factual   complex”   appears   fairly   broad   in   nature,   capable   of  
encompassing alleged  conduct  by  one  State  against  another  State’s  nationals  in  that  other  State  
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(here, the principal claim) and alleged conduct by that other State in its own territory against its 
own nationals (here the counter-claim). 
44 With respect to the law, the Court in Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia) 
accepted that the erga omnes obligations   at   issue   meant   that   one   Party’s   breach   could   not  
possibly excuse that of the other Party, but even so, 
the absence of reciprocity in the scheme of the Convention is not determinative as regards 
the assessment of whether there is a legal connection between the principal claim and the 
counter-claim, in so far the two Parties pursue, with their respective claims, the same legal 
aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility for violations of the Genocide 
Convention.69 
45 The Court also noted that in its order on interim measures of protection, it had called 
upon both States, not just Yugoslavia, to adhere to their obligations under the Genocide 
Convention,70 thus suggesting that there was a connection between the conduct of both parties 
with respect to the underlying dispute. When Serbia years later presented a similar set of facts in 
support of its counter-claim against Croatia (albeit this time with respect to the Krajina region of 
Croatia), Croatia did not contest the connection between the counter-claim and the claim.71 
46 The issue of connectivity was also addressed in detail in the Oil Platforms case, decided 
just four months after Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia).   Iran’s  principal  claim  
concerned U.S. attacks on three Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88, which 
allegedly violated Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic 
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Relations and Consular Rights, which  provides   that   “[b]etween   the   territories  of   the   two  High  
Contracting  Parties  there  shall  be  freedom  of  commerce  and  navigation.”72 
47 The U.S. counter-claim was not focused on the oil platforms but, instead, on Iranian 
small-boat attacks and mine-laying that harmed U.S. and other vessels in the Persian Gulf in the 
same  time  period  (the  U.S.  alleged  that  some  gun  boats  were  launched  from  Iran’s  oil  platforms).  
The United States identified seven specific incidents in 1987-88 involving such attacks or mine-
laying, but reserved the ability to add further incidents as the proceedings progressed.73 Iran 
contended that there was no direct connection between the counter-claim and the principal claim. 
As a factual link, according to Iran, the United States did not attack the three oil platforms 
because of the seven alleged Iranian attacks. As a legal link, six of the seven incidents did not 
involve  vessels  engaged  in  commerce  or  navigation  “between”  the  two  countries  (e.g., some of 
the attacks were against U.S. military vessels), while the seventh incident did not involve a U.S.-
flagged vessel for which the United States was entitled to advance a claim.74 The United States 
contested  those  views,  but  further  argued  that  Iran’s  attacks  generally had an effect on shipping 
protected by Article X by creating threatening conditions for all merchant vessels operating in 
the  Gulf,  and  that  the  U.S.  attacks  on  the  platforms  in  response  to  Iran’s  threatening  actions  was  
at the heart of its defence against the principal claim.75 
48 The Court found that the necessary connection existed, stating: 
[I]t   emerges   from   the   Parties’   submissions   that   their   claims   rest   on   facts   of   the   same  
nature;;  …  they  form  part  of  the  same  factual  complex  since  the  facts  relied  on  – whether 
involving the destruction of oil platforms or of ships – are alleged to have occurred in the 
Gulf  during  the  same  period;;  …  the  United  States  indicates,  moreover,  that  it  intends  to  
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rely on the same facts and circumstances in order both to refute the allegations of Iran 
and   to  obtain   judgment  against   that  State;;   and  …,  with   their   respective  claims,   the   two  
Parties pursue the same legal aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility for 
violations of the 1955 Treaty.76 
49 In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,  the  D.R.C.’s  claim  concerned  a  series  
of alleged acts by Uganda that constituted armed aggression (including incursions into and 
occupation of D.R.C. territory, and support of irregular forces in the D.R.C.), violation of the 
laws  of  war,  and  the  unlawful  downing  of  a  civilian  aircraft.  Uganda’s  counter-claim alleged that 
the D.R.C. had engaged in unlawful acts against Uganda, which the Court approached as falling 
into three categories: (1) alleged D.R.C. acts of aggression against Uganda; (2) alleged D.R.C. 
attacks  upon  Ugandan  diplomatic  premises  and  personnel   in   the  D.R.C.’s  capital,  Kinshasa,  as  
well as upon Ugandan nationals located there; and (3) alleged D.R.C. violations of the Lusaka 
Agreement of July 1999, which had attempted to end the armed conflict that had broken out 
among eight African nations in 1998.77 
50 With respect to the first category, the Court found that a direct connection existed. The 
Court  found  that  the  Parties’ “respective  claims  relate  to  facts  of  the same nature, namely the use 
of   force   and   support   allegedly   provided   to   armed   groups,”   and   that   temporally   both   claims  
“concern  a  conflict   in  existence  between   the   two  neighboring  States”   since  1994   (even   though  
Uganda’s  counter-claim ranged over a longer period than did the principal claim).78 With regard 
to   the   legal   connection,   the   Court   noted   that   “each   Party   seeks   to   establish   the   other’s  
responsibility based on the violation of the principle of the non-use  of  force”  in  Article  2(4)  of  
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the U.N. Charter and in customary international law, as well as the principle of non-intervention; 
hence the Parties were “pursuing  the  same  legal  aims.”79 
51 With respect to the second category, the Court reached a similar conclusion, even though 
the conduct at issue in the counter-claim (attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and 
personnel, and on non-diplomatic persons in Kinshasa) was not in the same geographic region as 
the conduct at issue in the principal claim. Here the Court focused more on the temporal 
dimension of those attacks having allegedly occurred at the same time (August 1998) as the 
alleged Ugandan invasion of the D.R.C., which therefore placed them in the same factual 
complex80 (the unstated assumption being that the alleged attacks were a response to that alleged 
invasion). Further, the Court noted that both parties were invoking rules on state responsibility 
and  on  the  protection  of  persons  and  property,  which  demonstrated  that  they  were  “pursuing  the  
same  legal  aims.”81 Ad hoc Judge Verhoeven voted against the  Court’s  decision,  saying  that  the  
alleged   attack   on   the   diplomatic   persons   and   property   in  Kinshasa   “does   not   appear   to  me   to  
throw any useful light for the Court on the armed aggression and unlawful occupation of part of 
its territory for which the Democratic  Republic  of   the  Congo  claims   to  have  suffered….  [T]he  
mere fact that this attack is part of a multifaceted history of conflict is not sufficient to justify the 
Respondent being authorized to seize the Court of this claim by way of counter-claim.”82 
52 The Court did not find the requisite connection with respect to the third category of 
Uganda’s  counter-claims, since the alleged violation of the Lusaka Agreement concerned matters 
of dispute resolution, which was not within the subject matter of the principal claim. According 
to  the  Court,  this  part  of  Uganda’s  counter-claims referred to the Congolese national dialogue, to 
the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo (MONUC) and to the disarmament and  demobilization  of  armed  groups  …  [and]   these  
questions, which relate to methods for solving the conflict in the region agreed at [a] multilateral 
level   in   a   ceasefire   accord  …,   concern   facts   of   a   different   nature   from   those   relied   on   in   the  
Congo’s   claims, which relate to acts for which Uganda was allegedly responsible during that 
conflict ….83 
53 Hence,   the   Court   found   that   this   part   of   Uganda’s   counter-claim was not part of the 
“factual   complex”   of   the   principal   claim.   Further,   this   part   of   the   counter-claim concerned an 
alleged violation of legal rules (in the Lusaka Agreement) that were not presented  in  the  D.R.C.’s  
claim, such that the parties were not pursuing the same legal aims with respect to this issue.84 
54 In the event that the Court finds there is no direct connection between the counter-claim 
(or portions thereof) and the principal claim, there is no indication in Art. 80 of the Rules as to 
what   procedure   the  Court   should   then   follow.   In   theory,   the  Court’s   discretion  might   include  
ordering that the counter-claim   will   henceforth   be   treated   as   a   separate   case   on   the   Court’s  
docket,  though  doing  so  would  be  an  unusually  robust  exercise  of  the  Court’s  discretion.  In  any  
event, the practice of the Court to date, once it finds no direct connection, has simply been to 
decline to entertain the counter-claim as a part of the case before the Court. 
55 Doing so leaves the Respondent free to initiate an entirely new case before the Court 
against the other State based on the subject matter of the erstwhile counter-claim. Indeed, the 
1936  Rules  of  Court,   in  Article  63,  expressly  stated  as  much,  saying:  “Any  claim  which  is  not  
directly connected with the subject of the original application must be put forward by means of a 
separate application and may form the subject of distinct proceedings or be joined by the Court 
to   the   original   proceedings.”   To   date,   however,   no   State   that   has   advanced   a   counter-claim 
unsuccessfully has exercised this option. If such a new case were filed, there would appear to be 
                                                          
83 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), p. 680, para. 42. 
84 Ibid. 
  
two possibilities for how the Court could proceed, as signaled in the 1936 formulation. The 
Court could address the two cases in separate proceedings, or could formally or informally join 
the two cases in a single proceeding, pursuant to Article 47 of the Rules of Court. If the latter 
were to occur, and if the Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the new case, then the two 
claims would proceed in a fashion very similar to what would have otherwise occurred if the 
counter-claim had been admissible in the first proceeding.85 
IV. Filing the Counter-Claim With the Counter-Memorial 
56 Para.   2   of   Art.   80   of   the   Rules   provides   that   the   “counter-claim shall be made in the 
Counter-Memorial  and  shall  appear  as  part  of  the  submissions  of  that  party.”86 Since Art. 80 of 
the Rules is located in the portion of the Rules of Court that deal with incidental proceedings, it 
is generally accepted that the reference here is to Counter-Memorial filed on the merits of the 
principal claim, not a Counter-Memorial addressed to jurisdiction or admissibility. Thus, the 
expectation is that, after an application is filed, any objections by the Respondent to jurisdiction 
or admissibility of the principal claim would first be addressed by the Court (a process especially 
likely since those objections must be raised no later than three months after the filing of the 
Memorial, regardless of when the Counter-Memorial is scheduled thereafter to be filed). Only if 
the Court decides against those objections is the Respondent expected to file its Counter-
Memorial on the merits, at which point it must file at the same time any counter-claim.87 The 
rule does not permit filing of the counter-claim at either an earlier or later stage in the 
proceedings nor does it apparently permit the submission of a counter-claim orally. Moreover, 
the   rule   does   not   permit   the   filing   of   a   “counter-counter-claim”   by   the   Applicant,   a   step   not  
attempted in any case filed to date before the Court. 
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57 In some instances, in the course of filing preliminary objections on jurisdiction or 
admissibility, a Respondent has included a reservation to the effect that, if such objections are 
not sustained, the Respondent may decide to file a counter-claim at the merits stage. Though not 
required by the Rules of Court, such a reservation is an understandable precaution and, in any 
event, signals to the Court the intention of the Respondent in the event that the case moves 
forward. 
58 Once a counter-claim has been filed in conjunction with the Counter-Memorial and has 
been found admissible, Art. 80 of the Rules does not address whether it should be notified to all 
States entitled to appear before the Court (as is done when an application initiating a case is filed 
with the Court, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court).88 In the initial 
cases involving counter-claims before the International Court (Asylum and Rights of U.S. 
Nationals in Morocco), no such notification appears to have occurred. Nevertheless, since the 
decision on admissibility of the counter-claim in Application of the Genocide Convention 
(Bosnia), a practice has developed whereby the Court instructs the Registrar of the Court to 
transmit  a  copy  of   the  Court’s  Order  on  admissibility   to   those  States89 or its Order scheduling 
further pleadings in the event that admissibility is not challenged.90 Doing so is an appropriate 
step, inter alia, to   ensure   that   any   State   that   believes   it   has   interests   at   stake   in   the   Court’s  
adjudication of the counter-claim may seek to intervene in the proceeding, pursuant to Articles 
62  or  63  of  the  Court’s  Statute.91 Even so, the Court does not transmit along with its Order the 
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portion of the Counter-Memorial advancing the counter-claim, so third States are left assessing 
the nature of the counter-claim  from  the  Court’s  Order  alone.92 
V. Counter-Claim as an Independent Claim and Not a Defence 
59 Once the counter-claim is permitted, the language of Art. 80 of the Rules strongly 
indicates that the counter-claim operates as an independent claim, neither as a defence to the 
principal claim nor as a claim dependent on the principal claim.93 Both paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Art.  80  of  the  Rules  refer  to  the  Applicant  as  simply  the  “other  party”  to  the  counter-claim; it is 
no   longer   exclusively   the   “Applicant”   in   the   proceeding.   In   the   event   that   the principal claim 
fails on the merits, or is withdrawn, there is no direct effect upon the counter-claim, which will 
stand or fall on its own merits. 
60 In Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), the Court confirmed that, although 
the counter-claim is   a   reaction   to   the   principal   claim,   “a   counter-claim is independent of the 
principal claim in so far as  it  constitutes  a  separate  ‘claim’,  that  is  to  say  an  autonomous  legal  act  
the  object  of  which  is  to  submit  a  new  claim  to  the  Court.”94 Further, the counter-claim widens 
“the  original  subject-matter of the dispute by pursuing objectives other than the mere dismissal 
of   the   claim   of   the   Applicant   in   the   main   proceedings,”   and   thus   is   “distinguishable   from   a  
defence on  the  merits.”95 In the normal course of events, this means that a counter-claim (unlike 
a defence) will identify a violation of international law for which the other party is responsible 
and will seek reparation from the Court for that violation.96 Hence, when Yugoslavia filed certain 
submissions as part of its counter-claim that related exclusively to dismissal of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina’s   claims,   those   submissions   were   not   viewed   by   the   Court   as   “counter-claims”  
within the meaning of Art. 80 of the Rules.97 
VI. Other  Party’s  Right  to  an  Additional Pleading 
61 Since the counter-claim is an independent claim, para. 2 of Art. 80 of the Rules 
establishes  procedural  equality  as  between  the  two  claims,  by  making  clear  the  right  of  the  “other  
party”  (i.e., the  Applicant)  to  “present  its  views  in  writing on the counter-claim, in an additional 
pleading”.  Thus,  whatever  schedule  that  may  be  set  by  the  Court  for  addressing  the  merits  of  the  
principal claim in the case, which under Article 45 of the Rules of Court always allows the 
Respondent to file the final   written   pleading   on   the   principal   claim,   the   “other   party”   to   the  
counter-claim will then be allowed to file a further written pleading that exclusively addresses its 
final views on the counter-claim. In this way, equal treatment is preserved as between the parties 
with the regards to their respective claims.98 
62 Thus,  when  the  Court  decided  favorably  on  the  admission  of  Yugoslavia’s  counter-claim 
in Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia),   it   stated   in   its  Order   that  “it   is  necessary  
moreover, in order to ensure strict equality between the parties, to reserve the right of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to present its views in writing a second time on the Yugoslav counter-claims, in an 
additional  pleading  which  may  be  the  subject  of  a  subsequent  Order.”99 The same language was 
included in its Orders for Oil Platforms,100 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Armed Activities (D.R.C. v. Uganda),101 and Application of the Genocide 
Convention (Croatia).102 Thereafter, the Applicants took advantage of this possibility to file a 
supplemental pleading. For example, in Oil Platforms,   Iran   filed   its   “Reply   and   Defence to 
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Counter-Claim”   in   March   1999   addressing   both   the   U.S.   position   on   the   claim   and   counter-
claim; the United States filed its Rejoinder in March 2001 responding to those arguments; and 
then   Iran   filed   a   final   “Further   Response   to   the   United   States   of   America   Counter-claim”   in  
September 2001, which related solely to the counter-claim arguments made by the United States 
in its Rejoinder. 
63 Although Art. 80,  para.  2  of  the  Rules  addresses  only  an  additional  pleading  “in  writing,”  
the same approach carries on through to the oral hearing. After   the   Respondent’s   final   oral  
statement (whether arising in a first or second round of the oral hearing),   the   “other   party”   is  
entitled to make an oral statement limited exclusively to its final views on the counter-claim. 
Thus, in Oil Platforms, at the end of the first round of the oral hearing, Iran was provided the 
opportunity to make an oral presentation limited solely to the U.S. counter-claim, and was again 
allowed that opportunity at the very end of the second round.103 
VII. Procedure for Deciding the Admissibility of the Counter-Claim 
64 Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules provides minimal guidance with respect to the procedure for 
deciding on the admissibility of the counter-claim. 
The Respondent would normally explain, as a part of filing the counter-claim with the Counter-
Memorial, why the counter-claim meets the two admissibility requirements. The President or 
Vice-President of the Court would then ascertain, in a meeting of the parties, whether the 
Applicant has objections to the admissibility of the counter-claim. As noted above, if there is no 
objection, the Court must still satisfy itself that the two requirements of paragraph one are met, a 
decision that apparently may be reached without receiving any further views from the parties, 
unless  the  Court  “deems  necessary”  receiving  such  views  per  Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules. 
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65 In cases before the Permanent Court, such as Factory at Chorzów, and in the initial cases 
before the International Court, including the Asylum and Rights of Nationals cases, the Court did 
not dispose of issues concerning the admissibility of the counter-claim in a preliminary 
proceeding. Instead, such issues were folded into the pleadings on the merits relating to the 
principal claim.Conversely, the Court often has disposed of the admissibility of the counter-
claim at a preliminary stage, pursuant to an Order addressing exclusively the admissibility of the 
counter-claim, whether or not the Respondent has objected to the admissibility of counter-claim. 
Thus, in Land and Maritime Boundary,  Cameroon  did  not  object  to  the  admissibility  of  Nigeria’s  
counter-claims, but the Court still issued an order indicating why the twin requirements of Art. 
80 of the Rules had been met. Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules however, does not require that the 
matter be disposed of at a preliminary stage. 
66 If there is an objection by the Respondent to the admissibility of the counter-claim, Art. 
80,  para.  3  of  the  Rules  provides  that  “the  court  shall  take  its  decision  thereon  after  hearing  the  
parties.”  Again,  the  rule  does  not  expressly  require  that  the  matter  be  disposed  of  at  a  preliminary  
stage; the issue of admissibility could be addressed as part of the reply and rejoinder pleadings 
filed in relation to the merits of claim and counter-claim. Nevertheless, in recent years the Court 
has instead initiated an incidental proceeding, ordering the Applicant to comment in writing upon 
the admissibility of the counter-claim under Art. 80 of the Rules and the Respondent to react to 
those views in writing. Doing so has the advantage of determining at an early stage whether the 
counter-claim should be included as part of the case. The disadvantages are that: (1) initiation of 
an  incidental  proceeding  slows  down  the  process  of  dealing  with  the  Applicant’s  claim;;  and  (2)  
at such an early stage, it may be difficult to determine whether the counter-claim is directly 
connected to the principal claim, since all the relevant facts and law on that claim have not be 
fully developed through pleadings on the merits. In his separate opinion in Oil Platforms, Judge 
  
Oda lamented this approach, which he viewed as an unfortunate departure  from  the  Court’s  past  
practice.104 
67 May the Applicant solely object to the jurisdiction of the counter-claim during the 
incidental proceeding, leaving for a later phase a possible objection as to whether the counter-
claim   is   “directly   connected”   to the principal claim? In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 
Germany   immediately   objected   to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction   over   Italy’s   counter-claim, but did 
“not  deem   it   useful   at   this   stage  of   the  proceedings   to   engage   in   a   legal   battle   about   the   links  
between”  the  principal  claim  and  the  counter-claim.105 Further, Germany asserted that there are 
other reasons as well that the counter-claim  might  be  inadmissible  and  that  “Germany  reserves  
the right to raise such additional preliminary objections, if need be,   at   a   later   stage.”106 Italy 
responded  by  acknowledging  “Germany’s  right  to  leave  open  for  now  the  question  of  the  direct  
connection,”  but  expressed  concern  that  doing  so  was  not  consistent  with  a  prompt  and  efficient  
disposition of issues that Germany wished to raise.107 Since the Court found that it had no 
jurisdiction over the counter-claim, the Court did not squarely address one way or the other 
whether it is permissible to challenge, in a preliminary phase, only the issue of jurisdiction.108  
68 Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules is  not  clear  as  to  whether  “hearing  the  parties”  requires  that,  
whenever an Applicant objects, the Court should provide an opportunity for an oral hearing.109 
Prior to the 1978 version of the rule, there was no language at all addressing the issue of 
“hearing”  the  parties,  referring  instead  to  the  Court  simply  engaging  in  “due  examination”  of  the  
matter.   The   1978   version   of   the   Rule   stated   that   “in   the   event   of   doubt   as   to   the   connection  
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between”   the   claim   and   counter-claim,   “the  Court   shall,   after   hearing   the   parties,   decide”   the  
matter. That formulation of the rule applied in Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia). 
After   Yugoslavia’s   counter-claim was filed, both parties apparently contemplated during a 
meeting with the President of the Court that they would submit written views to the Court on the 
counter-claims   admissibility   and   then   “be   heard   orally   on   the   question.”110 The parties then 
submitted their written views. Thereafter, the Court  decided,  having  received  “full  and  detailed 
written   observations,”   that   “it   does   not   appear   necessary   to   hear   the   Parties   otherwise   on   the  
subject.”111 Judge Koroma thought that the Court should have conducted an oral hearing,112 as 
did ad hoc Judges Lauterpacht113 and  Kreća,  with  the  latter  asserting  that  “‘hearing’  as  a  term  of  
procedure before the Court denotes, in the sense of Article 43, paragraph 5, and Article 51 of the 
Statute,   oral   proceedings   before   the   Court.”114 Their views, however, obviously were not 
persuasive to the Court. 
69 In Oil Platforms, the 1978 formulation was also at issue. Iran requested an oral hearing 
on its objection to the admissibility of the counter-claim both in its meeting with the Court and in 
its written observations.115 By contrast, the United States argued that no hearing was required 
under  Art.  80  of  the  Rules,  or  in  the  context  of  the  circumstances  of  Iran’s  particular  objection,  
given  that  there  was  no  “doubt”  that  the  principal  claim  was  connected  to  the  counter-claim.116 
Again, the Court decided that it was not necessary to hear further from the parties by means of an 
oral hearing.117 Judge Oda, in his separate opinion, questioned the propriety of finding a counter-
claim admissible without having an oral hearing but, here too, his position was not accepted.118 
                                                          
110 Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), supra fn. 1, ICJ Reports (1997), p.251, para. 7. 
111 Ibid., p. 256, para. 25;see also Salerno, F., ‘Demande reconventionnelle’, pp. 370 et seq. 
112 Ibid.,Sep. Op. Koroma, pp. 272, 276. 
113 Ibid.,Decl. Lauterpacht, pp. 278, 278-80. 
114 Ibid.,Dec.  Kreća,  p.267. 
115 Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), supra fn. 23, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 194-96, paras.7, 10-11.  
116 Ibid.,pp. 202-03, para. 29. 
117 Ibid., p. 203, para. 31. 
118 Ibid., Sep. Op. Oda, p. 215, para. 9. 
  
70 In 2000, the rule was changed to its present formulation, such that where an objection is 
raised  or  whenever   the  Court  deems  necessary,   “the Court shall take its decision thereon after 
hearing   the   parties.”   This   formulation   also   does not expressly require an oral hearing. In 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the Court received written pleadings from the parties with 
respect  to  Germany’s  objection  to  the  counter-claim and chose to decide the matter based solely 
on those pleadings.119 Judge Gaja, sitting as an ad hoc judge appointed by Italy, stated in his 
declaration  that  the  wording  introduced  in  2000  “appears  to  imply  that  an  oral  hearing  should  be  
held”   and   that   doing   so   “seems   particularly   justified  when   an   objection   relates to jurisdiction, 
given  the  impact  of  a  decision  on  jurisdiction,”  including  the  inability  to  bring  the  counter-claim 
as a separate case.120 Similarly,  Judge  Cançado  Trindade,  the  lone  dissenter  to  the  Court’s  order,  
asserted   that   the  Court  “should”  have  held an oral hearing, though he did not indicate whether 
doing so was required under Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules.121 Such arguments, however, were not 
viewed as persuasive by the other judges. As such, it appears that the Court does not regard Art. 
80, para. 3 of the Rules, even under its current formulation, as requiring an oral hearing. 
VIII. Withdrawal of the Counter-Claim 
71 If  no  objection   is  made  or   if  any  objections  are   rejected  by   the  Court,   then   the  Court’s  
review of the counter-claim will proceed to the merits phase, in conjunction with its 
consideration of the merits of the principal claim. Prior to addressing the counter-claim on the 
merits, however, the Respondent is free to withdraw the counter-claim with the consent of the 
other party, in the same manner that any claim can be discontinued.122 
72 For example, in the case on Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia), the 1997 
counter-claims filed by Yugoslavia were deemed admissible by the Court. In 2001, however, 
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Yugoslavia notified the Court that it wished to withdraw the counter-claims. The Court notified 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which indicated that it had no objection. The Court then allowed the 
counter-claims to be withdrawn.123 In Fisheries Jurisdiction, Norway apparently initially 
“reserved” a counter-claim against the United Kingdom for costs associated with capturing U.K. 
vessels that were allegedly wrongfully fishing in Norwegian waters.124 The Court decided the 
principal claim largely in favor of Norway, but without directly addressing the “counter-claim”;;  
after the Court transmitted its 1951 judgment to Norway, Norway informed the Court that it no 
longer intended to assert its counter-claim.125 
IX. Objections to the Counter-Claim at the Merits Phase 
73 As indicated above, often the counter-claim has been found admissible by the Court 
(Jurisdictional Immunities of the State being the primary exception). Unless the counter-claim is 
withdrawn, then the Court proceeds to the merits phase, where the parties are expected to plead 
to the merits of the counter-claim in conjunction with their pleadings on the merits of the 
principal claim. 
74 Even  at  this  “merits”  stage,  however,  the  Applicant  is  capable  of  challenging  aspects  of  
jurisdiction and admissibility of the counter-claim other than what was already decided in the 
context of the Art. 80 of the Rules incidental proceeding. Thus, at the merits phase of Oil 
Platforms, Iran contended that it was entitled to raise any objections to the jurisdiction of the 
Court over, and the admissibility of, the U.S. counter-claim that were not decided as a part of the 
Court’s  1998  order  on  admissibility under Art. 80 of the Rules.  To that end, Iran challenged the 
U.S. counter-claim on grounds that: (1) it was not presented after the negotiations required under 
the 1955 Treaty compromissory clause; (2) the United States cannot espouse claims on behalf of 
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other States or of non-U.S. entities, whose vessels or property were allegedly harmed; (3) the 
counter-claim extended beyond Article X(1) of the 1955 Treaty, the only provision over which 
the Court found it has jurisdiction; (4) the counter-claim   concerned   “freedom   of   navigation”  
issues,   but   the   Court’s   jurisdiction   over   the   principal   claim   only   concerned   “freedom   of  
commerce”;;  and  (5)  the  United  States  could  not  broaden the scope of the counter-claim beyond 
what was expressed addressed in the submissions to its Counter-Memorial.126 
75 The United States argued that all issues of jurisdiction and admissibility were resolved 
with  the  Court’s  order  on  the  admissibility  of  the counter-claim under Art. 80 of the Rules. The 
Court did not accept that position, stating instead: 
The Court considers that it is open to Iran at this stage of the proceedings to raise 
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the counter-claim or to its 
admissibility, other than those addressed by the Order of 10 March 1998. When in that 
Order the Court ruled on the "admissibility" of the counter-claim, the task of the Court at 
that stage was only to verify whether or not the requirements laid down by Article 80 of the 
Rules were satisfied, namely, that there was a direct connection of the counter-claim with 
the subject-matter of the Iranian claims, and that, to the extent indicated in paragraph 102 
above, the counter-claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Order of 10 March 
1998 therefore does not address any other question relating to jurisdiction and 
admissibility, not directly linked to Article 80 of the Rules. This is clear from the terms of 
the Order, by which the Court found that the counter-claim was admissible "as such"; and 
in paragraph 41 of the Order the Court further stated that: "a decision given on the 
admissibility of a counter-claim taking account of the requirements set out in Article 80 of 
the Rules in no way prejudges any question which the Court will be called upon to hear 
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during the remainder of the proceedings" (ibid., p. 205, para. 41). The Court will therefore 
proceed to address the objections now presented by Iran to its jurisdiction to entertain the 
counter-claim and to the admissibility thereof.127 
76 Thus,   the   Court’s   view   is   that   the   decision   reached   on   jurisdiction   at   the   incidental  
proceedings  phase  is  not  a  definitive  view  on  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  the  counter-claim. In 
the context of the U.S. counter-claim, all the Court had decided in 1998 was that the facts pled 
by  the  United  States  “were  facts  capable  of  falling  within  the  scope  of  Article  X,  paragraph  1,  of  
the  1955  Treaty”  and  “that  the  Court  had  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  United  States counter-claim 
in so far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, 
paragraph  1.”128 Likewise,  any  issues  of  admissibility  other  than  the  “direct  connection”  of  the  
counter-claim to the claim may be raised at the merits phase. As it turned out, in Oil Platforms 
the  Court  then  proceeded  to  reject  each  of  Iran’s  objections  to  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  or  the  
admissibility of the counter-claim.129 
77 The same situation arose in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo. At the merits 
phase,   the   D.R.C.   advanced   several   objections   to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction   over   and   the  
admissibility  of  Uganda’s  counter-claim. The Court permitted those objections, saying that the 
“enquiry  under  Article 80 as to admissibility is only in regard to the question whether a counter-
claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal claim; it is not an over-
arching  test  of  admissibility.”130 That  statement  is  somewhat  curious  in  that  the  Court’s  Art.  80  of  
the Rules analysis also concerns  whether  there  is  jurisdiction  “as  such”  over  the  counter-claim, 
even in circumstances (such as this case) where no objection was made to jurisdiction in the Art. 
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80 of the Rules proceeding. In any event, the D.R.C. was permitted to object to the admissibility 
of the counter-claim due to: waiver; the raising of new claims not specified in the Counter-
Memorial; the inability to advance claims on behalf of non-nationals; and the failure to exhaust 
local remedies. In its Judgment on the merits, the Court rejected all of those objections and thus 
found the counter-claims admissible, except that it 2declared  inadmissible  a  portion  of  Uganda’s  
counter-claims  which  concerned  “acts  of  maltreatment  by  [D.R.C.]  troops  of  Ugandan  nationals 
not enjoying diplomatic status who were present at Ndjili International Airport as they attempted 
to  leave  the  country.”131 With respect to those individuals, the Court found that Uganda had not 
established the nationality of the individuals so as to sustain the ability to bring a counter-claim 
premised on diplomatic protection of persons.132 
78 As occurred in both Oil Platforms and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 
one type of objection at the merits phase may be that the Respondent is expanding the counter-
claim beyond the scope of what was pled in the Counter-Memorial. In that regard, the Court 
stated in Oil Platforms  that the same rule applies to counter-claims as applies to claims. That is, 
the Court will seek to determine whether the new element is "a new claim" or whether it is 
merely   "additional   evidence   relating   to   the   original   claim,"   bearing   in   mind   that   it   “is   well  
established in the Court's jurisprudence that the parties to a case cannot in the course of 
proceedings   ‘transform   the dispute brought before the Court into a dispute that would be of a 
different  nature.’"133 Where  a  “new”  counter-claim is being presented at the merits phase beyond 
what was identified in the Counter-Memorial, it appears that the Court will deem such a claim 
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inadmissible. In both Oil Platforms and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,134the 
Court did not view the introduction of new elements as transforming the counter-claim in those 
cases and therefore did not sustain the objection on this issue. 
X. Disposition of the Counter-Claim on the Merits 
79 If the counter-claim survives the initial Art. 80 of the Rules proceeding and then further 
survives any objections to jurisdiction or admissibility that may arise at the merits phase, and is 
not withdrawn along the way, the Court proceeds to decide the counter-claim on the merits. In 
each instance where the Court has done so, it first addresses and disposes of the principal claim 
before turning to the merits of the counter-claim. Both the claim and the counter-claim are then 
addressed in the same dispositif to the judgment.135 
80 In some instances, the counter-claim will be rejected on the merits. Thus, in Rights of 
Nationals, the Court rejected the U.S. submissions relating to the unlawfulness of the imposition 
of certain taxes and rejected the U.S. position that customs authorities, when valuing goods, 
cannot   take   into   account   their   value   in   the   local  Moroccan  market,   stating   that   “the   value   of  
merchandise in the country of origin and its value in the local Moroccan market are both 
elements  in  the  appraisal  of  its  cash  wholesale  value  delivered  at  the  customhouse.”136 In Land 
and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon/Nigeria), the Court found that Nigeria had failed to prove 
the facts that would have supported its counter-claim, and further failed to establish that the 
conduct in question was attributable to Cameroon. 137 In Oil Platforms, the Court found that the 
United States had failed to prove that the alleged Iranian attacks on vessels in the Persian Gulf 
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violated the “freedom  of  commerce  and  navigation”  obligations  set  forth  in  Article  X(1)  of  the  
1955 Treaty.138 
81 In other cases, the counter-claim may succeed on the merits, but be so closely associated 
with the principal claim that the existence of the counter-claim may not make much difference in 
the case. Thus, in the Asylum case,  the  Court  agreed  with  the  submission  in  Peru’s  counter-claim 
that  Colombia’s  grant  of  asylum  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  applicable  asylum  convention;;  
however, in denying the principal claim by Colombia (seeking to exercise a right to grant asylum 
under that convention), the Court had already essentially reached that conclusion.139 
82 Yet is possible for a counter-claim to succeed and thereby result in a finding that would 
not otherwise be possible in the absence of the counter-claim. In Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo,   the  Court   rejected   the  first  category  of  Uganda’s  counter-claims to the 
effect that the D.R.C. had unlawfully used force against Uganda. The Court upheld, however, 
much  of   the  second  category  of  Uganda’s  counter-claims, finding that the D.R.C. attacked the 
“Ugandan   Embassy   in   Kinshasa,   maltreated   Ugandan   diplomats   and   other   individuals   on   the  
Embassy premises, maltreated Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport,”   failed   to  
protect  those  diplomats,  and  failed  “to  prevent  archives  and  Ugandan  property  from  being  seized  
from   the   premises   of   the   Ugandan   Embassy,”   all   in   violation   of   the   Vienna   Convention   on  
Diplomatic Relations of 1961.140 As such, the D.R.C. – the original Applicant in the case – was 
found to be under an obligation to make reparation to Uganda for the injury caused.141 
 
D. Concluding Observations 
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83 Given the considerable attention in the I.C.J. Statute and the Rules of the Court to the 
basic procedures for the filing of a claim by one State against another, it is remarkable that the 
Statute is silent on the issue of counter-claims, while the Rules are limited to a single article 
consisting of three short paragraphs. The explanation for such a lack of attention is probably 
threefold. First, though counter-claims have been available to Respondents throughout the life of 
the P.C.I.J. and I.C.J., to date they have been used quite sparingly. If counter-claims become a 
more significant  feature  of  the  Court’s  caseload,  there  may  be  calls  for  grounding  the  regime  of  
counter-claims in the Statute and in more detailed provisions of the Rules. Second, when 
counter-claims are used by Respondents, it is possible to fold them into proceedings that already 
exist for the claim of the Applicant; in other words, the basic procedures used for claims are 
largely used mutatis mutantis for counter-claims, thereby obviating the need to develop detailed 
rules for the latter. Third, while there may be some areas of uncertainty in Art. 80 of the Rules, 
the Court through its jurisprudence has provided considerable content to the meaning of that 
article, as discussed above. As such, the regime of counter-claims is a good example of how the 
Court can develop – incrementally and over time – sensible procedures for handling its docket. 
84 Overall, the current regime appears well-suited for balancing the interests of the 
Applicant and the Respondent. The Respondent is able to place before the Court its own 
grievances with  respect  to  the  Applicant’s  conduct,  but  is  not  able  to  derail  the  Applicant’s  claim  
by presenting matters  unrelated  to   that  claim  or  outside  the  Court’s   jurisdiction.  The  Applicant  
receives full notice of such grievances, is able to contest whether they are truly related to the 
Applicant’s  claim,  and  otherwise  is  able  to  litigate  the  merits  of  such  grievances  just  as  it  would  
if the counter-claim had been brought as a stand-alone case. In none of the cases involving 
counter-claims does it appear that the filing of counter-claims had a pernicious effect on the case; 
  
rather, in most instances it appears that they allowed the Court to receive a broader range of 
views on a broader range of issues than might otherwise have occurred.  
 
85 As such, the real value of the regime of counter-claims  is  that  it  advances  the  Court’s  role  
as a central institution for the pacific settlement of disputes. Disputes often arise in a context 
where both sides believe the other has transgressed international legal norms. The regime of 
counter-claims allows the Court to consider both sides of the dispute in a single, integrated 
proceeding, thereby creating the opportunity for the Court to address the dispute in a more 
holistic fashion. States themselves may be recognizing the value of pursuing counter-clams, 
since many of the cases in which they have been filed date to just the past fifteen years. Given 
the  value  to  litigants  in  “leveling  the  playing  field”  when  they  come  before  the  Court,  counter-
claims may continue to be a  significant  feature  of  the  Court’s  jurisprudence  in  the  years  to  come. 
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